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I. Introduction
The  best way to  assess the effectiveness  and efficiency  of a social  program is to  look at  its
outcomes.  For example,  does  the  program  reach  its  intended  recipients  or  are  others  also
benefiting?  Do the benefits  adequately cover the needs of the  beneficiaries?  Does it cover  a
significant  proportion  of those  who  need  help?  Are  there  other  programs  with  similar
objectives and characteristics?  Often, the answers to these questions depend on the incentives
facing  the  relevant  stakeholders  and  actors,  and  these  incentives  are  a  product  of  the
institutions  that are  involved  in  designing,  administering,  and  supervising  the  program.  In
recent  years,  policymakers  and  analysts  have  increasingly  recognized  that  the  institutional
environment  in which a social policy operates affects its outcomes.
Incentives  come in many forms.  They may take the form of costs imposed  on actors-
financial costs, effort, time, stigma, and foregone opportunities  among others.  Incentives may
be  manifested  as  benefits-money,  promotion,  recognition,  or  power.  Also,  incentives
influence  the behavior of all actors involved  in the design,  implementation,  and utilization of
social  programs,  including  policy designers,  central  and  local  administrators,  and  program
beneficiaries.
In this paper, we will  be  concerned  with incentives  and with the role of institutions  in
the provision of basic social  safety net programs  (as opposed to social programs  in general).
Social safety nets are those interventions  that provide cash or in-kind support or that help the
poor and vulnerable in  society to access basic social  services.  Safety nets programs include,
for  example,  cash  and in-kind  transfer  programs,  subsidies, public  works,  targeted  human
development  programs,  food  and  nutrition  interventions,  and  service  fee  waivers.  While
much of what ww will be describing  in this paper also applies to other areas  of social policy,
we will concentrate  on safety nets where relevant.
Part II of this paper examines the nature of social policy programs  and identifies ways in
which  social  policy  and safety  nets in particular  present  special  design  challenges.  Part  III
looks at the role of incentives in delivering safety net programs, focusing on ways to address
'  This  paper  was  produced  in  collaboration  with  Kai  Bucholtz,  who  prepared  the  study  on  devolution
experiences in the USA, and with Christine Weigand,  who prepared the empirical illustrations.
I am grateful  for stimulating  comments by the referees  John Blomquist, Margaret  Grosh,  Louise  Fox, Azedine
Ouerghi,  and Lant  Pritchett.  Their critical  comments improved  the  text considerably;  any remaining errors  are
mine.potential  incentive  incompatibilities  between  program  providers  and  sponsors  on  the  one
hand and providers  and clients on the other. Part IV discusses the role of existing institutional
structures  and  capacity  for  delivering  programs  and  suggests  possible  ways  to  structure
institutions  and  incentives  based on three hypothetical  examples of countries with differing
amounts of administrative  capacity.  Part V sums up the discussion.
II: The Nature of Social  Policy  Programs
There  is  no  such  thing  as  the perfect institutional  design  for a  social  safety  net program.
However,  details  matter  a great  deal.  Making  small  changes  in the  incentives  provided  to
clients/beneficiaries  and  to  administrators  and  decisionmakers  can  result  in  dramatic
differences in the performance, efficiency,  and effectiveness of the program.
All  social  programs  require  that  some  discretionary  power  and  responsibilities  are
shifted from the central  policymaking  level to the providers  in the field. In that context,  the
institutional  design  of social  safety net programs  shapes  the incentives  for all of the parties
involved,  including  legislators  at  the  central  and  local  levels,  local  administrators,  the
monitoring  agency, and the clients/beneficiaries.  Thus, the incentive  structure has  a decisive
impact on the success or failure of the program.
Theoretical Program Design
All areas of policy  depend  on institutional  incentives  and  questions  of institutional  design.
For example, relatively simple traffic  legislation regarding  speeding requires the same basic
kind  of  institutional  design  as  a  social  safety  net  program.  Someone  has  to  define  its
objectives  both in terms  of speed  and  the  effects  of limiting  speed.  The  legal  indications
(such as  traffic  signs and  speed  ramps)  and of law enforcement  (such as  radar  control  and
police  observations)  have  to  be  defined  as  do  the  way to  collect  fines  and  the role  of the
judicial  system.  The outcomes and the effects  are  relatively easy to monitor (in terms of the
driver's  actual  speed  of traffic,  number  of violations,  and  number  of accidents),  and  the
potential  for fraud  or corruption  is  easily  audited.  All of these  issues have  to be addressed
when designing new speeding regulations.
The same  general  issues  must also be considered  in designing  social policy.  However,
the process  is much more complex  because delivering  services in the social sector, especially
services  aimed at reaching the poor, is intrinsically difficult.  Ideally, the process from design
to  final  successful  implementation  involves  seven  key  steps:  (i)  defining  the  policy
objectives;  (ii) defining the policy instruments;  (iii) securing the financing;  (iv) piloting;  (v)
implementing;  (vi) auditing; and (vii) monitoring and evaluating.
Design of Safety Nets in the Real World
In the  ideal world,  a social  program  would work exactly  as  designed.  But the world  is not
ideal.  Perfect programs do not exist, any more  than perfect institutions  do. There  are at least
three  major  reasons  why  it is particularly  difficult  to implement  social  safety nets:  (i)  the
heterogeneity of service  delivery;  (ii) the limited existence of competitive  service providers;
(iii) it is difficult to adapt and adjust the design of programs during implementation.
Heterogeneity. Social  programs,  more  than  other  programs,  rely  on  local  providers
(individuals  or small groups of individuals) to deliver  services in the field. These  providers
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the  program  has  to  be  implemented  under  different  geographical,  social,  and  economic
conditions  in the different parts of a country. Ethnic, religious,  economic, and organizational
backgrounds may differ  significantly within the population,  and these factors can affect how
effectively  the  program  can be  implemented.  For  example,  family  structure  or religion can
alter  the  definition  of what  it  means  to  be  a  "household."  Alternatively,  regional  price
differences  that  reflect  the relative  scarcity  of certain  goods  or  differences  in  opportunity
costs, for example, may influence the definition of income or poverty.
Lack of Competition. Competitive  markets for social  service delivery  are hard to create,
and it is very difficult to  design  artificial  competitive pressures  to enhance the performance
of providers. Clients/beneficiaries  cannot register their dissatisfaction  by leaving the program
and even have limited opportunities  to voice their concerns.  As a result, they cannot provide
the signals that are necessary  for markets to operate.  This implies that providers may have a
degree  of monopoly  power  and  may  not  provide  the  services  in  the  way  that  program
designers had intended.
Inability to Adjust. Because of the lack of these "automatic signals," providers'  delivery
performance  must be constantly monitored,  which can sometimes  be difficult and expensive.
But even if monitoring  is undertaken,  program providers  and policymakers  must be  able to
adjust its design  and  implementation  to prevent undesirable  outcomes.  However,  they often
do not have the incentives or the capacity to do so. In order to perform effectively:
*  Providers  must  have  detailed  information  on  the  programs  and  understand  the
philosophy  behind  it,  its political  desirability,  and  the degree  of social  acceptance
that  it  has.  They  must  be  convinced  that  the  program  is  intrinsically  good  and
legitimate and that their efforts are important to society;
*  Providers  must  also  have the technical  knowledge  and equipment  to  perform  their
jobs.  If,  for example,  the  social program  uses  a sophisticated  questionnaire  to find
out what means a household has, the providers should be instructed in detail on how
to use the questionnaire.  This goes beyond technical instruction;  it requires also that
the providers are trained to apply their personal judgement wisely; and
*  Providers  must also be trained to understand why certain rules  are important in the
light of the necessity of treating all citizens equally. Also, providers must be taught
how to  deal  with the inevitable cases  of inefficiencies,  fraud,  or misallocation  due
to defective rules.
III: Incentives in Social Policy  Delivery
Providers  and  bureaucrats  are  no  different  from  other  officials  and  workers  in  other
organizations.  Their behavior depends very much on the incentives given to them. Designing
these  incentives  is  a  crucial  element  in  the  management  of social  programs.  This  section
explores  two basic institutional mechanisms  for influencing the implementation  of safety net
programs: those influencing relations  between the provider and the sponsors of the program
and those affecting relations between the provider and the clients or beneficiaries.
3Providers and Their Sponsors
There  are two  types  of financial  incentives  that relate  to the  relationship  between  service
providers  at the  local  level  and their  sponsors  (usually the  central  government)-personal
financial  incentives  and  institutional  financial  incentives.  These  deal  principally  with the
wage structure of providers and the larger program funding mechanisms, respectively.
Personal Financial  Incentives. Setting  the  wage  level  of social  service  providers  is  a
highly  contentious  topic.  The basic  difficulty  is that  it is nearly  impossible  to  attribute  the
marginal  contribution of every single person to the final output, which, in turn, does not lead
to  direct  profits.  It  is  equally difficult  to  quantify  the  importance  of competitive  salaries,
internal promotion, and career stability in improving  bureaucratic performance.
One might  assume that the simple solution for setting remuneration  levels would  be to
pay providers  according  to the prevailing  levels  for civil servants.  This may be effective  in
many developed  countries but not necessarily in developing countries.  The potential problem
stems from the fact that civil service salaries are typically significantly below the market rate
for private  sector  workers  with similar skills  and qualifications  (and  in  some cases  is  even
below subsistence  levels).  Further,  even meager  civil service salaries  often go unpaid due to
fiscal constraints  or government inefficiency.
The  problem  with such  discrepancies  in remuneration  is  that  only  the  least-qualified
individuals  (or,  in  exceptional  cases,  idealists)  will  be  willing  to  work for  social  service
providers.  This will eventually lead to a lack of capacity  or/and to a lack of motivation on the
part of providers to implement  the program properly.  Providers may even have an incentive
to  seek  gainful  employment  on the side  or to divert some of the  social  program's  funds to
themselves  or to their family and friends.  The effect may be somewhat reduced if wages are
supplemented by non-financial  remuneration  (access to services  such as cheaper  health care
or housing or to privileges  such as parental leave and early retirement)  or when civil servants
are eligible for bonuses  or have or direct  (legal) access to goods.  Non-competitive  payment
schemes  often cannot be solved within the context of the institutional  incentives provided by
a  single  social  program.  Nevertheless,  the  issue  can  and  should  be  counteracted  at  an
aggregate  policy  level  where  possible.  One  option  that  has  been  explored  in  developing
country settings has been to privatise the provision of social services, for example.
Institutional  Financial  Incentives. Social programs and social safety net provisions need
to be financed.  While  in some cases public goods may be partially paid for by user fees (for
example, public  transport),  this is not  a viable  option  for  social  safety net  programs.  This
means  that  safety  nets  and  most  social  programs  must  be  financed  from  taxes.  This
introduces  a  range  of  issues  that  need  to  be  addressed  when  setting  the  institutional
framework of a program:
*  At what level are the taxes going to be levied?
*  How are aggregate  budgets going to be defined?
*  At what level are individual allocation decisions going to be made?
There  are  two  answers  to  each  of these  questions:  either  decisions  are  taken  at  the
national  (central)  level  or  at  a  sub-national  (local)  level.  Local  decision-making  is  an
4increasing trend in much of the developing world, but presents a challenge to employ funding
mechanisms  which  ensure that program expenditures  can  be met  while creating  sustainable
spending incentives for local governments that frequently do not have taxing authority.
In  countries  where  sub-national  governments  levy  taxes,  mobile  tax  bases  are  rarely
relied upon (for  example, income  or capital  gains taxes).  First, poorer regions would tend to
collect less tax  than richer regions,  although  the  poorer regions  would probably need  more
public interventions  expenditures.  This can be counteracted  by so-called "equalization  funds"
in an attempt to equalize  conditions  among the regions,  but this  is a difficult  operation that
seldom  leads  to satisfactory  solutions  from  the poorer  regions'  perspectives.  Usually,  such
equalization  payments  are  based  on  a formula  that includes  one  or  more of the  following
criteria: income per capita, population, poverty (or "need"), and tax base. Alderman (1999,  p.
4)  suggests that, in order to target poor regions successfully,  national  governments  need "to
acquire exactly the type of information that the theory on decentralization posits they obtain
inefficiently."  A  second  problem  with  relying  on  mobile  taxes  is that  a  tax  competition
among regions could result which may lead to further inequality between the regions.
Sub-national  tax-authorities  rely largely on immobile tax bases,  including taxes on land
and property.  Taxing  immnobile  tax bases,  however,  typically  results in the need  for central
government to redirect  income from progressive  national taxes to sub-national  governments
or providers to make up revenue shortfalls. This fiscal gap can be addressed by implementing
a "revenue  sharing"  model in  which regions  receive  a fixed  proportion  of central  revenues
based  on  factors  such  as their population  and measured  needs.  Another  way to  address  the
regional  gap  is  "tax  base  sharing."  In  this  case,  the  central  government  taxes  income,  for
example,  at a nationwide  level,  and local governments  are allowed  to tax the same base  for
their  purposes.  However,  as  long  as  these  taxing  measures  are  not  linked  to  the  central
government's mandates  or policy objectives, there is no reason to assume that the money will
be spent on social programs.  Therefore,  these  methods are not usually used to finance  social
policy or social safety net programs.
Alternatively,  central  governments  can  set  up  grant  schemes,  in  which  the  central
government  provides  financial  support  to  local  governments  either  on  a  conditional  or
unconditional  basis.  In many  developing  countries  where  there  is no taxing  capacity  at the
local level but social  programs  are administered  locally,  grants from the central  government
are  the  only  source  of funding  (the  ultimate  fiscal  gap  problem).  Policymakers  have  the
choice  between  three  basic  models  for  providing  funding:  open-ended  capitation  grants,
block grants, and matching grants. Each model presents different financial  incentives  for the
local service providers.
Under open-ended capitation  grants, local providers of a social program are financed by a
grant from a single government  agent,  usually a Ministry.  The grant  in turn is financed  from
tax revenues or compulsory contributions. All expenditures at the local level are covered by the
capitation  grant.  In one  popular  form  of the  model,  the  costs of program  administration  are
financed as a percentage  of the social service/benefit  costs plus a fixed costs provision, and the
average cost per client/beneficiary  is pre-set by the central government.
Using  an  open-ended  capitation  grant  scheme,  the  local  provider  has  the tendency  to
maximize output without regard to costs. Consider, for example, universal  categorical benefit
programs  versus means-tested  programs.  In the former case,  such as a child-benefit  which  is
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based  on  a  single  simple  criterion  that  is  easy  to  administer  and  that  makes  fraud  not
impossible  but  difficult.  In  the  latter  case,  when  benefit  allocation  decisions  are  based  on
relatively  complex  criteria  that  require  providers  to  make  judgments,  they  may  have  a
tendency  to  be  lenient  with  disbursements.  Because  providers  do  not  have  a  financial
incentive  to limit the expenses of the program, they may allocate benefits  in borderline  cases
to  increase  output  and  case  numbers.  This  is not a  case  of corruption,  it is just a provider
reacting rationally to the incentives set in the institutional design of the program.
In  the  insurance  literature,  this  phenomenon  is  known  as  "a  third  party  payment
scheme."  Two parties, the provider and the client, make a decision, the bill for which is paid
by  another  party.  Under  such an  arrangement,  the  third party  has  two  ways  to  affect  the
decision-first  by setting the rules and, second  by monitoring  and auditing the outcomes of
the decisions.  If the  central  government  chooses  to  adopt  an  open-ended  capitation  grant
scheme, it will need to pay careful  attention to the design of the program in all of its aspects,
especially effective monitoring and auditing.
The  central  government  may prefer  to  look  for  another  financing  system  that  avoids
these  problems,  such  as  a  block  grant  or  a  matching  grant  (both  discussed  below).  For
example,  box  1 summarizes  recent  financing  actions  taken  in  the  Netherlands  to  address
incentive issues for local providers of the primary  social safety net program.
Box  1: Financing Arrangements and Incentives in the Netherlands
The Netherlands'  primary  social  safety  net  (Algemene  Bpstandswet) is provided  through  the  social  service
departments in each of the local  municipalities.  Prior to 2001,  90 percent of the funding for the activities of the
social  service  departments  came  from  an  open-ended  capitation  grant  from  the  national  government.  The
remaining  10  percent  of the  funding  came  from  a block  grant  from  the  National  Fund  for  Municipalities
(Gemeentefonds).
A  working  group  that  assessed  the  system  determined  that  the  financial  incentives  given  to  the
municipalities  did  not  adequately  encourage  them  to  seek  to  lower  the  number  of beneficiaries  either  by
reducing  the  number  of new  allocations  or  by stimulating  the  recipients  to  leave  the  social  safety  net.  The
reason for this is that municipalities  do not bear the cost of providing services and are not rewarded  if costs are
contained and if the program's effectiveness  is improved.
A  new  funding  arrangement  was  initiated  in January  2001,  which  reduced the  share  of the  national
contribution  to social  service  costs  to  75  percent,  again  in  the  form  of an  open-ended  capitation  grant.  The
remaining 25 percent of costs are budgeted as a block grant. However,  the budgeting rules were  changed so that
a municipality  that  spends  less  than the  budgeted  25  percent  can  use  the  difference  for  its  own  welfare  and
workfare  policy  or  on other  local  policy initiatives.  Early  indications  suggest  that municipalities  now  more
actively pursue policies to help beneficiaries leave the welfare rolls and find employment.
As described by Oates (1994), block grants effectively  balance the goal of relieving the
fiscal  burden  on  local  governments  of program  provision  with the  goal  of limiting  local
competition  for scarce  tax  resources.  Block  grants  typically  consist  of a  fixed  amount of
money transferred  to  local  governments  to supplement  existing  resources,  provided  either
unconditionally  or conditionally.  In  comparison  with  open-ended  capitation  grants,  central
authorities  are better  able  to control  program  costs  and ensure  that  local  providers  use the
added resources for their intended purposes.
6The  potential  spending  outcomes  and  differences  associated  with  conditional  and
unconditional  block  grants  are  illustrated  graphically  in  figure  1. It  is  assumed  that  local
policymakers  have  the  choice  between  spending  resources  on  the  social  safety  net  or  on
"other public goods"  (like parks, transport,  or culture) measured in dollars. The initial budget
constraint  is MQ.  To avoid  confusion,  indifference  curves  are  left out.  We assume  that the
local government chooses the allocation represented by point A.
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An unconditional  block grant of size $G  (=QR=MN)  is represented by an outward  shift
in the  budget  constraint,  from MQ  to NR.  As discussed  by Gramlich  (1977), we  generally
expect the consumption of both goods to increase  with income  (normal  goods in economics
jargon), so that income elasticities  will be between  0 and 1.
This condition  implies that-the after-grant  spending will be somewhere on NR bounded
by the end points of the shaded triangle to the north-east of initial point A. Hence,  spending
on social safety nets increases  by a positive amount less than the grant, with the actual size of
the increase  depending on the income elasticities of the two goods.
If the central government provides the same  grant of $G under the condition  that it must
be  spent only on social  safety nets,  the new budget constraint  is no longer NR but MPR  in
figure  1. With such a grant, a minimum expenditure  ($G) on social safety nets is guaranteed,
because  up to  point P local  governments  consider the  social safety net a free  good.  If local
governments spend more on both goods as income  rises, then the spending outcomes will be
the same under  either block  grant mechanism-represented  by  some point on NR bounded
by the triangle.
However,  if local government would not choose to spend more on social safety nets as
its  income  rises  (safety  nets  are  an  inferior  good),  then  imposing  conditionality  could
decidedly  affect  the level  of services  provided.  For  example,  if the local  government  pre-
grant spending  allocation  is represented  by point B  in figure  1, and safety nets  are  inferior
goods, then an unconditional  grant of $G might result in a new spending allocation on NR to
7the  left  of P.  In  such  a  case,  the  unconditional  block  grant  would  result  in less overall
spending  on  safety  nets  in  the  region.  Providing  a  conditional  grant  would  move  the
allocation to point P, ensuring at least $G are spent on safety nets.
An alternative  to  block  grants  are  matching grants. These  are  grants from  the  central
authority that match  a certain proportion of spending  at the local level.  Matching  grants are
applicable only in the  case  where local  governments  have  some  independent  spending  (and
revenue)  authority.  Matching  grants  are preferred  in theory  to  block  grants when there  are
local government externalities  or spillovers  on other regions. Use of matching grants changes
the marginal cost of social spending for the local government.  In contrast to the block grants,
which worked via an income effect,  matching grants work via a price effect. Matching grants
can  be  either  open-ended  or  closed-ended.  The  general  implications  of  both  types  of
matching grants are illustrated in figures 2 and 3.
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In  figure  2,  an open-ended  matching  grant of 50 percent  shifts  the  budget  constraint
from MQ  to MS.  Note that the  distance OQ  is equal  to  QS  because  the  price  of the social
safety net faced by the local government  has decreased by one-half as a result of the grant. If
the price elasticity  of spending on the social safety net is unitary and the initial position is C,
spending will shift to point D, the whole amount of the grant (CD in this case) being spent on
social  safety  nets.  If the price  elasticity  is larger than one,  spending  on other public  goods
might  even decrease  as  a result  of the grant,  leading to a spending  allocation  on DS.  (The
logic behind a decrease in spending on other public goods is that the local  government has to
match  its allocation of the increased  spending  on the social  safety net.)  In the case of price
inelastic  demand  for  social  safety  nets,  other public  goods will  profit  from  the grant,  and
spending on both goods will increase  (to any point on MD). However, any point to the left of
E (implying a decrease in spending on social safety nets in response to receiving the grant) is
not realistic  because we do not expect a negative price elasticity of spending on social safety
nets (or a negative income effect that outweighs the price effect).
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In the case of open-ended  matching grants,  the central  government has no control  over
its  own  budget  because  the  amount  of grant  that  it  provides  depends  on  the  spending
behavior of local governments.  For this reason,  closed-ended matching  grants  are used more
frequently.
If there  is a limit of $H  (=QU) to the  matching grant, the community  will face  a kinked
budget constraint  MTU as in figure  3. For a community  where the local  government chooses
initially not to  spend  much on social  safety  nets (point  F), the  grant will  seem like an open-
ended matching grant.  It is highly unlikely that the  local  government with preferences yielding
F in the initial position would use up the whole potential of the grant,  $H. Instead, they choose
a point on MT, because they do not want to sacrifice much of their consumption of other public
goods in order to pay their portion of the increases  in spending  on the social  safety net,  even
though its price has decreased  by a half.  For communities  with local governmnents  who put a
high priority on spending on social safety nets (point G), the  grant will have the same effect as
a block grant and these governments are likely to choose a point on TU.
In general,  the higher the limit $H, the more likely the grant is to work like a matching
grant. And the lower the local matching  rate, the more the grant will work like a conditional
block grant.  The central government will  ideally take such considerations  into account when
designing a closed-ended  matching grant by influencing the matching ratio as well as the cap.
Matching  grants  have  been  used  extensively  by many  western  governments  in  response to
increased  program  devolution.  In  the  US,  for example,  until  1996  states  received  between
one-third  and  one-half of their  expenditures  on Aid  to  Families  with  Dependent  Children
(AFDC)-the  cash-transfer  safety  net  predecessor  to  the  Temporary  Assistance  to  Needy
Families (TANF) program-from the central government in the form of matching  grants.
Due  to the many influences  and unquantifiable  effects, comparing  the  likely  impact of
the  different  grant  mechanisms  is  not  easy.  As  Gramlich  (1977)  discusses,  open-ended
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on social  safety  nets.  As  shown  above,  unconditional  block  grants  are the least  appropriate
for  increasing  specific  expenditures,  but  (compared  with  an  equal  grant  amount  under  a
matching  system) they allow the highest utility level  for the local  government.  Closed-ended
block grants lie somewhere in between the other two models.
Some commentators  view conditional  central  grants  as a constraint  on  local autonomy
(Bahl  and  Linn,  1992,  p.465), while  others welcome  it as  a way to  ensure  some minimum
provision of public goods,  especially  in the case of social  safety nets.  It should be noted that
effects of grants  on local spending decisions may  be even  greater than predicted by standard
economic  models.  According  to  theory,  giving  an  unconditional  grant  to  a  region,  for
example,  should  have  the  same  impact  as  giving  an  equivalent  lump-sum  payment  to  its
inhabitants;  some fraction of the income  should be spent  on current  goods and  services  and
some  on other items  such as investment and tax relief.  Yet in practice,  governments tend to
spend a huge fraction of grants on goods and services. For example, many U.S. studies of the
actual  effect  on  state  and  local  government  spending  of various  types  of federal  grants
suggest that nearly  all grant funds  are spent  on public goods and services  (Hines and Thaler
1995).  This  phenomenon  is  known  as  the  "flypaper  effect,"  a  concept  introduced  by the
economist  Arthur  Okun,  and  is  captured  by  the  phrase  "money  sticks  where  it  hits."
Numerous  hypotheses  have  been put  forward  for this  finding.  An  appealing  explanation  is
that politicians  benefit more  politically  from higher  spending  than from  offering  minor tax
cuts  to  citizens.  As  a  result,  grants  from  the  central  authority  may have  a greater  positive
effect on local spending than theory predicts.
Providers and Their Clients
The  point  of contact  between  the  providers  and  the  clients,  where  the  service  is  actually
delivered,  is  another key  issue  in  the  design  of the  institutional  aspects  and  incentives  of
social programs.  Beautiful structures,  careful preparations,  and noble intentions  are useless if
the final delivery of the  service is not good enough. Clients  are influenced by several aspects
of social programs  even  before they  have  any contact  with the providers.  It  is important to
note  that  the disbursement  of a social  benefit  or the provision  of a social  program  may  in
itself provide  incentives  for  the  clients.  The  very  fact  that  someone  gets  a  benefit,  for
example, may influence  his or her attitude to their labor supply. The labor  supply effects of
safety  nets  benefits  have  been  studied  at  length  elsewhere  and will  not be  addressed  here
(see, for example,  Moffit, 1992 for discussion of the US).
To  Apply  or Not  to Apply?  There  are  three  major  reasons  why  potentially  eligible
beneficiaries  would not apply for a program. These include:
*  Clients are not informed  about the program.  Many countries have programs that are
unknown  to  the  targeted  population.  A  recent  study  in  Latvia,  for  example,
illustrated that people in the poorest deciles of the income distribution simply do not
know  that  a program  exists.  Similarly,  in  the  Netherlands,  40  percent  of those
entitled to a housing benefit did not have information on the program. Clearly, there
is  a  need to  clearly  define  who has  responsibility  for  informing the  public of the
existence of programs and for making sure that all groups are reached.
*  Clients do not understand the program.  In the Latvian case mentioned  above, the social
assistance  legislation  is  so  complicated  that  it  is  difficult  even  for  researchers  and
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Too  complicated  systems  are  found  in  many  of the  former  Soviet  Republics.  In
Kyrgyzstan, there are 40 dense pages listing all the benefits  of the social policy sector.
Not only is there a need to provide adequate information about safety net programs, but
probably most programs should be streamlined and simplified.
The opportunity  costs of applying exceed  the  benefits.  Under the Armenian  social
assistance  legislation,  for  example,  a  mother  applying  for  a  small  benefit  for  a
disabled child has to collect many administrative  documents  from different  sources
in different locations, requiring literally days of travel and queuing. As a result, few
bothered to apply. A realistic  estimation  of all of the  costs that an applicant  has  to
pay must be factored  into the design of any social program.
Corruption. Corruption  does  not  originate  in  the  twisted  minds  of  semi-criminal
elements but  in  scarcity  and  in  the  rational  behavior  of agents.  Of course,  given  the exact
same  conditions,  some  bureaucrats  will  accept  bribes  or  tolerate  deviations  from  the  rules
while  others  will  not.  This  does  not  mean  that  program  designers  should  ignore  the
possibility  of corruption.  Corruption  is a  serious problem  especially  where  social  programs
are  concerned  because  it can  undermine the  efficiency  and the  effectiveness  of the program.
Moreover,  it threatens the long-term credibility of the program and of all government actions.
Corruption comes in many different forms: (i)  acceptance of bribes from clients; (ii) applying
rules  assessing  eligibility  or  entitlements  in  ways  that  favor  or  hinder  clients;  and  (iii)
diverting funds, property, or revenue from the social program.
There  are  two  distinct  ways  to  reduce  the  incentives  for  corruption  in  an  existing
program:  (i)  by simplifying  the program  and/or (ii)  increasing the costs  of corrupt activities
to the corrupt individual.
While  bureaucrats  and  politicians  often  add  additional  controls,  restrictions,  and  rules
aimed  at deterring  corruption  within a given program,  this may not have the desired  effect.
Increasing the  complexity of a program  often also increases the costs of complying  with the
program,  which  may  be  a  disincentive  for many  of the  targeted  population  to  participate.
Moreover,  complex  programs  are  more  difficult  to  monitor  and  to  audit  than  simple
programs,  making  it  easier  to  hide  corrupt  behavior.  On  the  other  hand,  simplifying  a
program  can  be  a  potent  anticorruption  strategy.  This  can  be  done  by taking  away  any
opportunity  for people  to undertake  undesirable  or corrupt  activities.  For example,  in cash
transfer  programs,  the  chance  of corruption  can  be  reduced  by minimizing  the  number  of
different individuals  and  locations through  whose  hands money must pass before  it reaches
the  beneficiary.  Instead,  money  can  be  centrally  distributed  using  the  postal  service  or
existing banks to reduce the involvement of local officials, or it can be distributed in the form
of coded cards for beneficiaries  to use in stores directly.  Such methods simplify the program
and  may simultaneously  reduce  corruption.  However,  it  is not  always  possible  to simplify
effectively,  especially when there  are only limited technology and financial institutions at the
local level at which the program is being implemented.
The  second way of reducing  the incentives  for corrupt behavior  is to increase  the costs
of corruption.  This can be achieved by restricting the amounts  of the benefits of the service
or the periods during which services  or benefits are  distributed.  This means that the corrupt
providers  and clients must repeat their operation, with an increased risk of being caught, andthat the gains from every  single operation  are so limited that many parties will no longer find
it worth the risk. Fostering an anticorruption climate in the country can also increase the costs
of undesirable  behavior  through  the  development  of a  system  of credible  and  effective
monitoring and auditing and by increasing competitive pressure.
IV: Institutional Structures and Program Implementation
The earlier sections of this paper have highlighted the fact that institutions  and the incentives
that  they  create  for  stakeholders  heavily  influence  the  chances  that  a  social  safety  net
program (or any social program) will be successfully implemented.  However, more broadly,
the success  of a program  will be affected  by the existing institutional  structure  and capacity
that  prevails  in  a  region  or  country.  This  includes  the  capacity  of the  central  and  local
governments,  the  extent  to  which  non-governmental  providers  operate  in  the  country  in
question and  their capacities,  and  the extent to  which  communities  can become  involved  in
the administration of the programs.  This section  explores more fully the  role of institutional
structures  and  capacity  by focusing  on  three  generic  cases:  one  country  characterized  by
limited institutional  capacity, one with limited but developing  institutional capacity,  and one
with fully developed institutions.
A  Country with Limited Institutional Capacity
If there is a dysfunctional  bureaucracy and a lack of trustworthy law enforcement in a country,
few  programs  can  be  viable  if they  are  designed  according  to  theory.  In  this  situation,
sometimes  even  after the  program has been designed  and the desirability  of implementing  it
has been established, the best course may nevertheless  be to abandon it. The damage done by a
badly implemented program may be far greater than any benefits it could yield.
Limit the Programs. However,  it may be possible to limit the program's  objectives  and
scope.  In some cases, the  "best"  in policy terms can be  the enemy of the "good."  It may be
beneficial  to  accept  certain  flaws  in  the  system  in  the  knowledge  or  hope that  what  the
program can do it will do well enough.  For example, the costs of precise targeting may be too
high  to  justify  the  institutional  costs  of implementing  it,  so  the  program's  designers  may
choose to target by age group rather than by means testing.
In those countries where the bureaucracy  in some regions or parts of the country is more
functional  than in other parts, the less-developed  regions  can sometimes be  stimulated by the
successes  achieved in the regions with an effective  bureaucracy.  For example,  in South Africa,
some  provinces  have  social  safety  net  programs that  seem to  perform  relatively  well  while
stimulating the less advanced provinces and the central government to follow in their footsteps.
Involve the Central Government (with Foreign Support). In those countries  where local
capacity may be lacking but where ample capacity and legitimacy exist at the national  level,
there is a good chance that some programs  can be implemented very successfully. Over time,
the central  government can transfer  some of its technical and  administrative  capacity to the
local  level.  For  example,  the  guaranteed  minimum  income  and  single  benefit  social
assistance  system  in  Kyrgyzstan  seemed  unviable  when  it was first  designed.  However,  it
was implemented relatively successfully due to a fairly strong central institutional structure, a
detailed  three-year  local  training  program,  and  the  close  involvement  of international  aid
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Development Bank.
Involve  the Community.  One  of the problems  in poorer  countries  is often  the  lack  of
ownership  of  safety  net  programs  by  important  stakeholders  in  the  population.  This
ownership  can be built up on a  small and  local  scale by involving some  key local  actors  in
the design of the program. NGOs, churches, religious leaders, and well-informed  local people
can be consulted during many phases near the start of the design process.  In this way, central
authorities  can avoid making mistakes that are not clear to them but that are easy to detect at
the local level. Moreover, corruption can be avoided or diminished if a local community  feels
that it has ownership of a program.
A  further  step  would  be  to  use  community  leaders  to  administer  or  even  deliver  a
program.  These  community-based  administrators  can  make  use  of their  knowledge  of the
local social fabric to make decisions about the allocation and distribution of benefits/services.
Often,  if decisions  are  made  locally,  then  they  are  seen  as  being  more  legitimate  by the
communities that  stand to benefit  from  the program  than if the decisions  had been  made  at
the  central  level.  In  order  for  devolution  to  function  effectively,  there  must  be  a  certain
tradition  of action  at  the  community  level,  and  the authority  of the  decision-making  body
should be largely undisputed.
While  these  conditions  are  seldom  fully  met,  there  are  some  good  examples  of
community-based  social  safety  net  programs  in developing  countries.  In  Uzbekistan,  the
traditional  Malhalla  system  is  used  to  implementthe  country's  social  assistance  program.
Under the Uzbek system, the Mahalla  (a traditional gathering of community "elders")  has the
discretion  to  give  assistance  benefits  to  any  household  that  it  deems  needy.  General
guidelines require the Mahalla  to consider and record extensive  information on the recipient
households,  but  the  final  decision  rests  with  the  Mahalla  itself.  In  Albania,  local  well-
informed  people  play a role  in the  social assistance system.  Alderman  (2000)  estimated that
the allocation  of benefits  seems to be well-targeted  as local  Albanian officials  seem  to have
more  knowledge  about  the  households  in  their  communities  than  would  be  available  to
relative  outsiders  like  central  civil  servants.  In Tajikistan,  parent-teacher  commissions  are
used to allocate  child benefits to the poorest children  in school  districts, but this is a recent
development so there are no evaluation  data yet.
Despite  the  fact  that  the  examples  above  appear  to  be  successful,  their  potential
applicability  on  a  larger  scale  should  not  be  overestimated.  Many  conditions  have  to  be
fulfilled for extensive local community involvement in safety net programs  to be effective.  The
level of technical  capacity at the  local level is frequently  not sufficient and required extensive
development  through  training  and  intensive  supervision.  There  is also  a danger  that  local
leaders  will  not direct  the  program's  benefits  to  the intended  target population.  In  addition,
local  leaders may lose the support of the local community if they are called upon to undertake
tasks and take decisions that may not be part of their traditionally accepted responsibilities.
A  Country with Nascent Institutions
If some  parts  of the country's  bureaucracy  can  function  adequately,  including  some  local
governments  and  communities,  some additional  institutional  options may be  available.  We
identify two such options in this section:  (i) decentralize  responsibility over the allocation of
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and  (ii)  use the  emerging  private  sector,  including NGOs,  to provide  effective  services.  A
third option involving the complete devolution of the policy process  will be discussed in the
following  section  but  may  also  be  relevant  to  countries  with  a  partially  functioning
bureaucracy  and evolving institutions.
Target Safety  Net  Resources  Geographically. Can  poverty  and  vulnerability  only  be
addressed  by providing benefits  directly  to  identified individuals  and families  or is it useful to
target entire areas with predominantly poor populations?  Specifically,  is regional  and geographic
targeting  a  viable  option  in  countries  where  the  bureaucracy  is  not  working  properly?  The
evidence on geographic targeting is mixed but depends crucially on the program's design and on
the existence of effective institutions (governmental agencies  and other service providers) within
the targeted region (Ravallion,  1999  and 2000 and Alderman, 2000).  In those  countries where a
functioning bureaucracy  exists, geographic  targeting can be considered.
Geographic  targeting  usually has relatively  low administrative  and  economic  costs  but
of course has the disadvantage that it tends to include the non-poor among the beneficiaries.
The efficiency  of geographic  targeting increases  with the proportion of poor members in the
region  in question  and  can  be  further increased  by using  it  in combination  with  additional
targeting efforts through the community.
An  example  of successful  geographic  (and  other)  targeting  is  the  Mexican  Progresa
program. Initially,  104,000  localities were  ranked according  to "marginality"  on the basis of
a set of data (including variables such as the percentage of illiterate population  aged  15 years
and  over  and  the  percentage  of households  without  access  to  clean  water,  sewage,  and
electricity).  On the basis of that ranking, 76,000 localities were selected to receive additional
assistance.  Within  these  selected  localities,  households  were  ranked  according  to  their
reported per capita income  for all household members.  A poverty line was constructed,  and
all households  with a  reported  income below the poverty  line were  selected  for  assistance.
The resulting  list was then  revised  on  the  basis of feedback  from the local  authorities  and
from  community  members  who  were  able  to  judge  the  real  "poverty"  situation  of the
households.  The results are modestly encouraging,  but a minimum amount of data of decent
quality is needed to rank the localities in order to make sensible decisions.
Relying on Private  Sector Service Providers. So far, we have  assumed that the provider,
whether  public  or  non-public,  was  a  local  monopolist.  This  can  be  a problem  since  these
providers have few incentives either to limit costs or to deliver a good  service.  The question is
whether it would be possible to allow many providers to deliver a social safety net program and
let them act as competitors.  There are many social programs where many providers are the rule
rather than the  exception,  mainly  in health  care  and in education  (in these  cases,  fixed  costs
capitation  financing  is  often  used).  However,  few  safety  net  programs rely  on  competitive
providers,  whether  for profit  or not-for-profit.  It is  intrinsically  difficult to introduce  market
elements into safety net programs. Private firms are not likely to be attracted by the prospect of
providing  the  kind of services  offered by these  programs.  In the Netherlands,  attempts  have
been made to privatize  the  delivery of some  social  services,  but in general  success  has  been
limited and total  program  administrative  costs  have  actually  increased.  However,  Uruguay's
experience with privatising the school feeding program has been more positive  (see box 2).
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This  school  feeding  program  provides  a meal  and/or  snack  to  needy  children  in primary  schools  located  in
disadvantaged  areas  throughout  Uruguay.  The  eligibility of each  school is determined  according  to measures
correlated  with  need,  such  as  average  level  of the  students'  mothers'  education  or an  index  of basic  unmet
needs.  The  school  director  then  identifies  those  students  within  the  selected  schools  who  are  most  in  need.
Initially, the school's staff procured the food and prepared the meals.
An evaluation conducted  in 1996 revealed  that there was a large variation  in  the nutritional  content of the
meals  provided  under the  program  and that meals  were  costly  to produce through  the  schools.  As  a result  of
these  findings,  food procurement  and  preparation  was contracted  out to private  providers.  The  involvement  of
private  providers  has  improved  the  quality  of the  meals  through  standardized  specifications  of caloric  and
nutritional content, and costs have been reduced.
As a rule, private subcontracting  in the social  sectors requires a huge commitment  from
the  government in terms of regulating,  monitoring,  and training the private  sector providers.
However,  many  governments  of developing  countries  lack this capacity.  Moreover,  private
firms (for-profit  firms as  well  as not-for-profit  ones)  require  a market  of at least  a certain
minimum size.  This means that,  even in health and education,  private sector  involvement  is
usually  limited  to  densely  populated  urban  areas.  When  these  pre-conditions  regarding
market  size  and  governmental  capacity  to  regulate  and  control  are  met,  there  are  various
ways  to  encourage  competition  among  these  providers.  The  most  popular  of  these  are
vouchers,  service  contracting,  management  contracting,  lease  contracts,  and  concessions.
Each  of them  has its  limitations.  Nevertheless,  despite the  limitations  that are traditionally
associated  with  private  sector  involvement  and  competition,  the  intention  to  increase
competitive  pressure  was one of the main reasons  why, in some countries  (notably the US),
the entire process of designing and implementing safety net programs was decentralized  from
the federal to the state level.
An  additional  option  for increasing  the  number  of private  sector providers  may be  to
involve  local  and international  NGOs  more  fully  in  public  provision  of safety  nets. NGOs
can  range  from  large-scale  international  organizations  such  as  the  Red  Cross,  Oxfam,  or
Medecins sans Frontieres  to local micro-organisations  that specialize in lobbying for a single
local issue. They are often very well  informed about  special aspects of social conditions,  and
they often have well-established  relations with parts of the community. In many cases, NGOs
are  extremely  dedicated  to  their  mission,  and  their  employees  or  colleagues  are  highly
motivated and committed. These are all undoubtedly positive arguments in favor of including
NGOs in the implementation  of some kinds of social programs.  In many countries,  they play
an important role  in the provision of health  care.  In Bolivia,  for example,  about a quarter of
the health care facilities in the big cities are provided by NGOs.
However,  some  cautionary  remarks  are  in  order.  First,  NGOs  often  have  little
experience in running safety net programs.  Second, the strong points of NGOs are frequently
also their weaknesses; they know local  situations very well, but that does not mean that they
can run programs in other parts of the country or in other circumstances.  As with community-
based programs,  the central  government  would  still have  to play a  strong  supervisory  role,
especially concerning training, monitoring, and evaluation.
A  Country with Developed Institutions
Even in a nation with a fully developed institutional structure, the design and implementation
of safety nets and social programs  is a dynamic  process.  Policymakers  must  get the mix of
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whenever  necessary  in  order  to  improve  its performance.  Institutionally,  the programs  can
either be organized around a centralized bureaucracy-and  this may be preferable  when local
government,  private  sector,  and  community  capacity  is  limited-or  they  can  have  a more
decentralized  structure.
Program  Mix and Fine-tuning.  As a social policy system becomes more sophisticated,  it
usually becomes more complicated  as well, which introduces  new problems.  One problem is
that of cross-incentives.  Social  programs  often have  objectives  that  are  interrelated  and,  in
some  cases,  even  contradictory.  Also,  the  sheer  number  of programs  in  any  one  country
creates enormous  complexity.  This problem  is especially prevalent  in OECD countries  with
long-standing welfare  states.  In these countries,  social programs  have been introduced over a
long period  and often in a piecemeal way,  and little attention has been given to cross-effects
and  internal  consistencies.  In most  developing  countries  and transition economies,  many  of
these problems  can be avoided by reforming or "fine tuning" programs to make them simpler
and more consistent. Regular monitoring and evaluation will reveal what aspects are working
as the  designers  intended,  where  incentives  are  working  the  wrong  way,  and  what are  the
unexpected  and  undesired  side-effects  of  the  program.  Moreover,  the  programs  will  be
subject to exogenous  influences.
Partial  or Complete Devolution. Devolution  is  a concept  that has  received  increasing
attention  worldwide  among  policymakers,  principally  as  a  result  of the  social  safety  net
debate  in  the  US.  Devolution  and  decentralization  are  synonymous  terms  and  refer to  the
process whereby the central  government  delegates  certain policy decisions to a lower, more
local administrative  and legislative  level.
One key argument  in favor devolution is that local authorities are better informed  about
their constituents than central authorities and are in a better position to identify those in need
and to ensure that they receive the program's services.  This is especially true in environments
in which  information  on  the population  is not readily  available  or where reaching  the poor
and vulnerable  is difficult.  Local officials can be invaluable  in targeting  social assistance  to
those  most  in need.  For  example,  in  the  case  of Albania,  local  officials  use  a  variety  of
sources of information that would not be accessible to the central government.  Local officials
are also  in a better position to monitor  recipients:  "Households  will be  less able to conceal
information about  their circumstances  from locally based  authorities  than from those  at the
national  level." (Alderman, 2000).
Another argument in favor of decentralization  is the assumption that local government  is
more  accountable  to citizens  because  they can more  easily  observe and  control the decisions
and  expenditures  of authorities  in  their  vicinity  than  those  of the  central  government.  The
veracity of this assumption clearly depends on whether citizens  in the country in question have
effective  control  over local government.  Even if true,  if the funding  for the social  safety net
comes  from the  central  government  but the program is  administered  locally,  local authorities
have no incentives to keep costs down or increase the efficiency of the program. To counteract
this problem,  grant schemes (as described  above) can be designed to transfer funding  from the
central government to the locality in such a way that this accountability is maintained.
It  is  important  that  any  form  of devolution  or  decentralization  be  based  on  a  clear
contract  between  the central  and  local  governments  (see Tanzi,  1996).  The  responsibilities
16and power  of each  level of authority must be clearly  identified,  and  each should  be  given
sufficient  resources  to  enable  them  to  carry  out  their  responsibilities  successfully.  An
example from the US  suggests that getting this balance right, including  ensuring that there is
adequate  local administrative  capacity,  is far from easy.  Several  countries, including Mexico,
Indonesia, and Thailand,  have recently been struggling to identify the roles of institutions  and
governments  in the context of decentralizing the delivery of safety net services.
V: Summary
The  premise  of this  paper  is that  institutions  matter  in  the  design  and  implementation  of
social programs in general  and of safety net programs in particular.  We argue that designing
a  safety  net  program  presents  particular  challenges  given  the  nature  of the job that  these
programs  are supposed to do. First, helping the poor and vulnerable requires that the program
should have  wide coverage  and  access,  necessitating  a certain degree  of decentralization  of
service  provision  and administration.  Second,  there are usually very few providers of safety
net  services,  which  creates  certain  incentive  problems.  Also,  providers  may  not  have  the
capacity  or incentives  to undertake  the sort of monitoring  and constant adjustments required
to implement programs effectively.
Incentives and the Design of  Safety Net Programs
There  are  several  mechanisms  and  strategies  that  can  be  used  to  help  to  ensure  that the
incentives provided  to  the stakeholders  and  actors  are compatible  with  the  goals of social
safety  net  programs.  These  can  be  categorized  in  terms  of  whether  they  relate  to  the
relationship  between  providers  and  the  program's  sponsors  or  the  relationship  between
providers  and the program's beneficiaries.
Providers  and Sponsors. Personal  financial  incentives are clearly  a prime motivator  for
providers,  whether  from  the private  or public  sector.  Ensuring that the  wage  rate  for civil
servants  and  other providers  is competitive  with wages  paid at other equivalent  workplaces
and  adequate  to  the  purposes  of  the  program  will  go  a  long  way  toward  reducing
underperformance  and potential corruption.
However,  the financial  incentives provided through the institutional structure itself are a
frequently  overlooked element in the success or failure of a program's design. The key issues
are how programs are financed and who has the power to make spending decisions. There  are
several  revenue-sharing  mechanisms that can correct incentive problems, including matching
grant  schemes.  But  where  local  revenue  capacity  is  limited,  other  grant  schemes  such  as
block grants can encourage  local providers to spend wisely and efficiently.
Providers  and Clients. Our discussion focused on the behavior of the providers  and did
not  address how the  labor  market behavior of beneficiaries  was  affected  by the program's
characteristics.  We  did  note,  however,  that  the  design  of the  program  gives  potential
beneficiaries  a disincentive  to apply for the program, and care should be taken to avoid  such
consequences.  This  includes  keeping  the  all  of the  costs  associated  with  applying  for  a
program  low  including  time  spent,  effort,  and  opportunity  costs.  Information  about  the
program  should be freely available so potential beneficiaries can make intelligent choices.
17The behavior  of the providers  themselves  can  hinder the  efficiency  of the  program.
Potential  corruption-from  outright bribery  to  selective  application  of eligibility rules-
can undermine  a program's  objectives.  The incentive  for corrupt behavior can originate  in
the  design  of  the  program  itself.  Design  features  that  can  reduce  the  incentives  for
corruption  include simplifying the program's  objectives  and process,  such as reducing the
number of administrators  and officials involved  in safety net transactions.  Another solution
may  be  to  distribute  cash  directly  to  beneficiaries  through  the  postal  service  or  through
electronic  cards,  thus  reducing  the  involvement  of officials  and  reducing  transport  and
security costs.  It  is  also  possible  to increase  the  costs  of corrupt  behavior  by  increasing
oversight  and  monitoring  activities  and  restricting  the  amounts  of the  benefits  or  the
periods during which they are distributed.
Institutional Structures and the Implementation of Safety Net Programs
In addition to being influenced  by funding strategies  and the design features of the program
itself, the effectiveness of a program is affected by whatever the macro  institutional  structure
prevails in the country  or region. There  are three hybrid cases that characterize the extent of
development of the institutional structure,  for each of which several program  design features
may be appropriate.
In  Countries  with  Limited  Institutional  Capacity.  With  a  largely  dysfunctional
bureaucracy,  the best  strategy  may be  to  limit the  objectives  and  scope  of the  program  to
avoid making  the program dependent  on unreliable  institutional  structures.  This can include
involving  the  community  through  community-targeting  efforts,  permitting  less  stringent
targeting  rules,  or  limiting  the  program  to particular  regions.  Alternatively,  if weak  local
capacity is the problem, maintaining  a strong central involvement can be effective,  bolstered
by  the  support  of  NGOs  and  possibly  foreign  donors.  Coordinating  the  program's
implementation  with  non-governmental  bodies  and  local  communitiesis  a  particularly
promising strategy.
In Countries with Nascent Institutions. If some  parts  of the  government  bureaucracy
function well and if private sector and local institutions  are developing,  other design options
can be considered.  These include using more sophisticated targeting methods to get resources
to the regional and local  levels and involving the private  sector more in the delivery of safety
net services.
In Countries with Fully Developed Institutions. In  countries  with  a  fully  functioning
bureaucracy  and  private sector  institutions, a broader  range of design options  are available.
Institutionally,  programs  can  be  organized  around  a  central  bureaucracy  or  can  be
decentralized;  these programs  can rely heavily on private providers  and communities or can
be run by the  public  sector.  In any  case,  policymakers  must be concerned  with the mix of
different programs and minimizing overlaps between them.
A significant strategy for increasing the overall institutional  effectiveness and efficiency
of social policy has been to  devolve responsibility  for social programs to local governments
and providers.  This has not been attempted on a broad  basis but has been  implemented  in a
number  of  countries,  most  notably  in  the  US.  There  is  as  yet  no  conclusive  evidence
regarding  the  success  of this  devolution  strategy,  but  it  is  important  that  any  form  of
devolution  or decentralization  be  based on a clear  delineation  of the responsibilities  of the
18central  and  local  governments  with  adequate  provision  made  for  funding.  Devolution
decisions  should not revolve so much around considerations  about more or less government
but instead should aim to guarantee good government and good governance.
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Institutions  matter in  the design  and implementation  of social
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